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FINANCING THE UNITED NATIONS
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
Foreword
In the period since the founding of the United Nations in 1945
the vast changes in the political and economic setting and climate for
United Nations operations and activities have affected both popular and
official attitudes toward the financial support of the United Nations.
During this time the economic position of the Western powers and that
of the Soviet Union have greatly improved while that of the less-developed
countries has improved only slightly. In recent years the first high
hopes of the west for the success of the United Nations have waned or at
least have not been sustained at the same level, while the expectations
on the part of the less-developed countries have increased markedly. As
a result, those countries most able to support the United Nations finan-
cially now show diminished interest in any expansion of its operations
which would require a substantial increase in their financial support at
the very time when those countries least able to support it financially
have come to expect more from the United Nations. Meanwhile the latter
group is steadily increasing in its voting strength in the General
Assembly.
The variety of both United Nations activities and the methods used
to support those activities may have contributed to the wide lack of under-
standing of the problems of financing such activities. Whatever the cause,
in the United States in recent years there has been steady pressure in
both the executive and the legislative branches of goverrment to reduce
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the portion of the cost to be borne by the United States; and the failure
of other sources of income either to meet the increased needs or to absorb
the load carried previously by the United States may have tended to put a
ceiling on the growth potential of the United Nations.
Popular support of the United Nations in the United States tends to
outrun the preparedness of the government to match such support finan-
cially. The expectations of the general public are not realistic in
terms of what is possible under existing methods of financing.
Moreover, many of the ardent supporters of efforts to increase
the powers and activities of the United Nations tend to overlook the
unwillingness of other countries to provide the additional financial
support necessary for such expansion.
Inside the United Nations, the great changes in composition and
the probable resulting change in balance of power are likely to influence
the actions of those countries able to contribute more to its financial
support.
There are, then, several factors likely to play an important part
in determining the nature, extent, and sources of future revenues for the
United Nations, matters which may well be as important as the decisions
on the use of the veto power in determining the usefulness of the United
Nations. Witness the crucial nature of the problems of financing the
United Nations Emergency Force and the United Nations forces in the
Congo.
It will be the purpose of this paper to review the practice to
date; to examine some of the problems encountered; to review some of
the proposals that have been made for increasing the revenue of the
United Nations; and to suggest some guidelines for possible action to
secure a solution to the financial problems of the United Nations.
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I CURRENT ARRANGEMENTS AND HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE
The current arrangements for financing the United Nations ac-
tivities and operations have been in effect essentially in their present
form since the inception of the United Nations system.* Memberst contri-
butions to the regular budgets and to the Specialized Agencies are assessed
on a proportionate basis. Special programs or projects are financed for
the most part by voluntary contributions. The rate of contribution of
the United States to the regular budget has been gradually reduced over
the years from 39.89 to 32.51 per cent, the difference having been made
up by the contributions of new members and by some increases in the rates
of others.
Some indications of the order of magnitude of the financial re-
quirements of the United Nations system for all of the member countries
and for the portion contributed by the United States may be seen from
Table I. In the period from 1946 to 1958 the estimated expenditures
by all member countries for the regular assessed budgets of the United
Nations, the Specialized Agencies, and Special U.N. operations plus the
voluntary contributions by governments to Special Programs amounted to
approximately two and one-half billion dollars ($2,435,301,855.), of
which the United States Contributed 47.7 per cent or $1,161,847,020.
*By "United Nations System" is meant the UN plus the 12 specialized
agencies:
Universal Postal Union, International Telecommunications
Union, International Civil Aviation Organization, World
Meteorological Organization, Food and Agriculture
Organization, International Monetary Fund, International
Cause for Reconstruction and Development, UN Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization, International Labor
Organization, World Health Organization, International
Finance Corporation, and Intergovernmental Maritime
Consultative Organization.
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Total Estimated Expenditures, United Nations, Specialized Agencies,
United States Contributions, 1946-1958.1
and Special Programs, and
Assessed Budgets:
United Nations
Food and Agriculture Organization
International Civil Aviation Organization
International Labor Organization
International Telecommunications Union
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization
Universal Postal Union
World Health Organization
World Meteorological Organization
Sub-total
United Nations Emergency Force
International Refugee Organization
Special Programs (Voluntary Contributions)
ICAO joint support program
United Nations Children's Fund
UN expanded technical assistance program
UN Korean Reconstruction Agency
UN Refugee Fund and High Com. for Refugees
UN Relief for Hungarian refugees
UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in
the Near East
WHO malaria eradication program
Sub-total
Total
Total
All members 2
$576,866,241.
66,912,304.
36,298,993.
76,312,025.
17,986,324.
107,049,431.
5, 497,770.
92,982, 414
2,624,040.
982,529,542.
55,0o,Oo.
412, 691, 915.
16,702,210.
253,211,161.
190,806,044.
145,135,192.
17, 493,818.4
14,458,281.
342,216, 008. 5
5,057,684.6
985,080,398.
$2,435,301,855.
U.S. Contributions
Amount.5
$193,996,352.
20,634,165.
8,726,050.
16,945,911.
1,640,995.
37,127,973.
198,560.
33,472,845.
358,746.
313,101, 597.
25,944,413.
237,116,356.
7,738,265.
145,231,000.
110,232,774.
92,902,615.
5,558,ooo. 4
5,000,000.
214,022,000.5
5,000,000.6
585,684,654.
$1,161,847,020.
Average per year 7 187, 330,1142.
Table I
Per cent
33.62
30.83
24.04
22.20
9.17
34.68
3.61
35-13
13.67
31.86
47.17
57.45
46.33
57.35
57-77
64.01
31.77
34.58
62.546
59.45
47.70
89,)372,8A7. 47.70
Footnotes to Table I
1. Based upon "United States Contributions to International Organizations", the Sixth Report on the
Extent and Disposition of U.S. Contributions to International Organizations for the Fiscal Year 1957,
Pursuant to Public Law 806, 81st Congress, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, House Document No. 360, Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1958.
2. Ibid., Appendix IV, Table 33. Figures included for 1957 and 1958 were estimates.
3. Ibid., Appendix III, Table 32. Figures included for 1958 were estimates.
4. Includes UN Refugee Fund and UN High Commissioner for Refugees.
5. Includes UN Relief for Palestine Refugees and UN Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East.
6. Total pledges from other governments were not complete as of date of publication of the original
table; hence percentage could not be determined at that time.
7. These figures offered only for the purpose of giving an indication of general order of magnitude for
each year of the 13-year period.
The regular budgets for the United Nations itself amounted to a little
over one-half billion dollars ($576,866,241.); for the Specialized Agencies,
$h05,663,301.; for The United Nations Emergency Force, $55,000,000.; for
The International Refugee Organization, $412,691,915.; and for the spe-
cial programs (voluntary contributions) $985,O80,398.
The average expenditure per year for all budgets and for special
programs amounted to $187,330,,142. The United States contribution aver-
aged $89,372,847.
These figures do not represent the total cost of participation in
the U.N. System to the member countries. They do not include the costs
of representation in the various organs and organizations of the U.N.
System; nor do they include costs incurred by members in discharging
certain duties or obligations on behalf of but not charged to the
United Nations, e.g., costs of military equipment and se'rvices placed
at its disposal. However, they represent a major segment of the costs
of international organization, and for a large number of the countries
represent the major part of the total costs, facts to be kept in mind when
we examine later the distribution of these costs among the member countries.
Even if the figures were brought up to date to include contribu-
tions through 1960, the total amounts involved would be small compared
with expenditures for military and economic development programs.
The Pattern of Financial Contribution
It should be noted that, although the assessed budget of the United
Nations was the largest, it represented only 23.2 per centt of the total
expenditures whereas the expenditures for special programs represented
40.4 per cent. As for the United States, its contributi6n to the assessed
budget of the United Nations represented 61.9 per cent of its contribu-
tion to the U.N. and Specialized Agency budgets but only 16.6 per cent
of its total contribution; and its voluntary contribution to the special
programs represented 50.4 per cent of its total assessed contribution.
By 1958 (the most recent year for which reasonably complete in-
formation is available) the pattern of expenditures had changed some-
what from that of the total period up to that time. The 1958 U.N.
assessed budget represented 52.8 per cent of the combined U.N. and
Specialized Agency assessed budgets as compared with 58.7 per cent
for the total period 1946-58; and the U.N. assessed budget repre-
sented 22.8 per cent of the combined budgets and special'programs
as compared with 23.2 per cent. On the other hand, the total vol-
untary expenditures for all countries for special programs had risen
from 40.4 to 46.3 per cent.
The U.S. contributions in 1958 to the U.N. assessed budget re-
presented 54.6 per cent of its contributions to the U.N. and*Special-
ized Agencies budgets in comparison with 61.9 per cent up to that
time; in other words, the relative proportion represented by the
U.N. proper had declined. But United States contributions to spe-
cial programs in 1958 represented 60.5 per cent of its total contri-
butions to all budgets and programs as compared with 50.4 per cent.
A breakdown of the total estimated expenditures for 1958 is
given in Table II,
Of even more importance, the 1958 figures show that 40 countries
constituting 48.7 per cent of the membership of the United Nations
were assessed a total of $1,617,100, or only 3.15 per cent of the
amount assessed to all members. The individual contributions of
those 40 countries was less than $100,000. each. If we add countries
whose contributions were in amounts ranging from $100,000. to 500,000,
we find that 62 countries out of a total of 82, or 75.6 per cent of
the total membership at that time were assessed a combined total of
Table II
Total Expenditures United Nations, Specialized Agencies, and Special Programs and United
States Contribution for 1958 (Estimate)1
Assessed Budgets
United Nations
Food and Agriculture Organization
International Civil Aviation Organization
International Labor Organization
International Telecommunications Union
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization
Universal Postal Union
World Health Organization
World Meteorological Organization
Sub-total
United Nations Eergency Force
Special Programs (Voluntary Contributions)
ICAO Joint support program
United Nations Children's Fund
UN expanded technical assistance program
UN Korean Reconstruction Agency
UN Refugee Fund (High Com. for Refugees)
UN Relief for Hungarian refugees
UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
in the Near East
WHO malaria eradication program
Sub-total
Total
2
Total
All Members
$55,062,850.
8,610,400.
3,592,901.
8,073,901.
2,116,541. 
12,124,609.
566,355-
13,566,130.
455,823.
14,169, 510.
25,000,000.
2,100,990.
22,500,000.
31,890,422.
2,000, 000.
4,000,000,.
3,500,000.
410,660,000.
5,057,684.
111,709,096.
240,878,606.
U.S. Contributions 3
Amount
16,621,922.
2,712,495.
1,028,2242.
1,750,000.
153,200.
3,401,102.
24,571.
4,666,480.
66,050.
30,424,062.
8,127,500.
903,316.
11,000,000.
15,500,000.
1,333,000.
25,550,000.
5,000,000.-
59,286,316.
97,837,878.
See footnote (1 to Table I.
Ibid. Appendix IV, Table 33.
Ibid. Appendix IV, Table 32.
See footnote (7 to Table I.
1.
2.
4.
$6,396,300, or only 12.43 per cent of the amount assessed to all mem-
bers. Assordingly, 20 countries constituting 24.4 per cent of the
membership were assessed $45.,103,700, or 87.58 per cent of the amount
assessed to all members. (See Table III for a breakdown in dollar
categories of scale of assessments for the United Nations and United
Nations Emergency Force for 1958. The latter costs have been appor-
tioned in accordance with the regular contribution scale.)
The addition of new members of the United Nations since 1958
further accentuates the difference between the proportion of total
costs being borne by a small number of members and the limited share
being borne by the overwhelming majority of members.
An analysis of the assessments to the United Nations Emergency
Force for 1958 is especially striking. (See Table IIIA p. 13) It shows
that 28 countries constituting 34.1 per cent of the total membership
were assessed $360,000, or 1.4 per cent of the total amount assessed
to all members. Their individual contributions were in amounts of
less than $25,000. each. The 52 countries whose individual contri-
butions were in amounts of less than $100,000 and which constituted
63.4 per cent of the total membership at that time were assessed
$1,655,875, or only 6.6 per cent of the amount assessed to all members.
Another 20 countries constituting 24.4 per cent of the total membership
of 82 at that time were assessed a combined total of $4,537,500, or
18.2 per cent of the total. These countries made their contributions
in amounts ranging from $100,000. to $500,000. each. At the other
extreme, 10 countries representing 12.2 per cent of the earlier total
membership were assessed $18,720,000, or 75.1 per cent of the amount
assessed to all members. Five of the ten in this last category con-
tributed a total of $16,080,000. It is painfully clear that a large
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Table III
Distribution of Scales of Assessments, 1958, for the United Nations
Eergency Force1
and the United Nations
Classification
Under $25,000.
$ 25,000. to $100,000.
$100,000. to $500,000.
$500,000. to $1,000,000.
Above $1,000,000.
Number of
Countries
14
26
22
12
8
Total Per Cent
of Assessments
2.59
9.28
15.24
72.34
Assessment
(Total)
$ 288,400.
1,328,700.
4,779,200.
7,848,600.
37,255,100.
UNEF
(Total)
$ 140,000.
645,ooo.
2, 320,000.
3,810,000.
18,085,000.
99-50 $51,500,000. $25,000,000.
1. See Footnote Table I. Based upon Appendix I, Table 2.
H
0
82
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TABLE IIIA Classification of Assessments UNEF
for 1957 and 1958
1957
Number ofClassification
Under $25,000 39
22$25,000 to $100,000
$100,000 to $500,000
$500,000 to $i,ooo,ooo 2
3Over $1,000,000
Countries Total Amount Number of Countries Total Amount
28
24
$ 405,437.
1,298,031.
3,637,160.
1,592,358.
8,094,001.
20
5
5
$ 360,000.
1,295,875.
4,537,500.
2,640,000.
16,080,000.
$15,026,987. 82 $24,913,375.
Based upon Appendix I, Table 2.
1958
H
H
l See Footnote 1, Table I.
portion of the total expenditures for such an essential security measure
as the United Nations Emergency Force is dependent upon a very small
minority of the membership.
The extent of this pattern of contribution can be seen even more
clearly when the total contributions to all special programs of the
United Nations for the period 1947 to 1957 are examined. Those programs
included The United Nations Childrens Fund, The United Nations Expanded
Program of Technical Assistance, The United Nations Refugee Fund, The
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees and The
United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees, and The United Nations
Korean Reconstruction Agency. The number of members contributing
during this period varied, but for the entire period there was an
average number of 55 contributing countries. During the 11-year per-
iod these countries contributed $835,891,l14 to the special programs
listed above. Twenty-four of this number, or 43.27 per cent, made con-
tributions of less than $100,000 each; and their combined contributions
represented only .39 per cent of the amount contributed by all countries.
Fourteen countries, or 25.L5 per cent, made contributions from $100,000.
to $500,000, making 2.11 per cent of the total contributed by all coun-
tries. Thus, counting the total contributions to all special programs
for the entire 11-year period, we find that 68.72 per cent of the countries
which made contributions gave less than $500,000 and accounted for only
2.5 per cent of the total contributed by all countries.
When the next higher category of contributions is examined, we
see that six countries, or 10.9 per cent of those contributing to the
special programs, made contributions ranging from S500,000 to $1,000,000
each, representing in all 2.49 per cent of the total contributed by all
countries.
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Table IV
Distribution of Total Contributions to Selected Special United Nations Programs, 1949-1957
Program
UN Children's Fund(l
UN Expanded Program
of Te hnical Assis-
tance 2
UN Refugee Fund(3
UN Relief & Works
Agency for Palestine
Refugees & UN Relief
for P lestine Refu-
geesZ4
UN Korean R construc-
tion Agency 5
Total
Number of Under $25,000
Contrib. Number
Countries Countries Amount
75
84
26
53
35
16 $204,077.
11 143,025.
14 97,736.
21 140,206.
10 94,767.
$679,811.
$25,M00-$10,000
Number
$100, 000-$500oo,000
Number
$500,000-$1,000,000
Number
Over
$1,000,000
Number
Countries Amount Countries Amount Countries Amount Countries Amount
14 $824,463.
23 1,370,759-
19 $5,224,276.
22 4,972,567.
7 2,401,066.
4 172,971. 13 2,904,541.
6 254,750.
$2,622,943.
9 2,156,532.
$17,658,982.
9 $6,057,792.
10 7,013,530.
3 2,165,787.
5 3,672,017.
3 1,936,850.
$20,845,976.
17 $191,162,133.
18 189,420,032.
2 5,701,141.
10 272,235,124.
7 135,564,972.
$794,083,402.
Total
$203,472,741.
202,919,913.
10,365,730.
279,124,859.
40,007,871.
$835,89., 114.
(A See Footnote 1, Table I. Based upon Appendix 1, Tables 22, 23, 24, 25, and 26.
(1. 1947-1957.
(2. Covers 8 year period.
(3. Covers 3 year period.
(4. Covers 8 year period.
(5. Covers 7 year period.
Table V
Distribut on of Percentage of Contributions to Selected Special
1947-1957 A
Total
Number of
Contrib. Countries
UN Children's Fund 75
UN Expanded Program
of Technical Assistance 84
UN Refugee Fund 26
UN Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine
Refugees and UN Relief
for Palestine Refugees 53
UN Korean Reconstruction Agency 35
Under
25,00(
21.3%
13.0%
53.8%
39.6%
28.5%
25,000
to
100,000
18.6%
27.3%
7.5%
17.1%
United Nations Programs,
100,000
to
500,000 Over
to
500,000 1,000,000
25.3%
26.1%
26.9%
24. 5%
25.7%
12%
11.9%
11.5%
9.4%
8.5%
(A See Footnotes to Table IV.
H
1,000,000
22.6%
21.14%
7.6%
18.8%
20 %
In terms of all of the countries which made contributions for
the 11-year period, 78.8 per cent of them contributed only 4.99 per
cent of the total contributions, whereas 1 countries, or 20.36 per
cent of the total number, accounted for 94.99 per cent. (See Tables
TV and V for a breakdown of contributions by dollar category and pro-
gram.)
The following countries have made the major contributions to
the special programs:
Country Percentage of total contributions
United States 61.7
British Commonwealth, 19,74
including United Kingdom,
Canada, India, Australia,
and New Zealand
France 3.57
Soviet Union 1.67
Netherlands .92
Italy 56
China .25
The other countries combined made contributions in the amount of 11.5h
per cent of the total. The order of rank of the programs in terms of
size of contributions was as follows:
(1) United Nations Relief and Works Agency.
(2) United Nations Childrens Fund.
(3) United Nations Expanded Program of Technical
Assistance.
(4) United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency.
(5) United Nations Emergency Force.
(6) United Nations Refugee Fund.
(See Table VI)
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Total Contributions to Special Programs, by Selected Countries
and all contributing Countries (A
Amounts in dollars unless otherwise indicated.
Countries UNEF
Canada 1,235,224.
China 2,027,548
France 2,227,310
India 1,161,283
U. S. S. R. 5,455,676
Byelorussia 188,010
Ukraine Russia 721,759
United Kingdom 3,052,262
United States 13,023,563
Sub Total 1 29,092,635
Australia 644,879
New Zealand 168,165
Netherlands 448,931
Italy 813,045
Sub Total
Including 1 31,167,655
Other Countries 8,861,333
Total All
Countries
40,028,988
Child en's
Fund k2
10,662,606.
69,704
5,928,948
2,076,012
1,500,000
3,399,000
134,231,000
157,867,270
13,652,464
2,865,000
361,112
1,255,290
176,ool,136
29,062,187
205,063,323
Technical
Assistance (3
11,122,727.
120o,000
10,581,071
2,975,000
6,ooo,ooo
250,o000
625,O
15,568,792
110,232,774
157,475,364
3,515,953
1,215,399
5,307,553
823,o000
168,337,269
36,414,667
204,751,936
U. N.
Refug
Fund T9
446,093
UNRWA
5,279,054 7,
674,286 11,890,697
244,133,
728,027
4,000, 000
5,848, 406
391,839
266,000
763,474
7,269,719
3,347,032
10,616,751
51,335, 488
188,472,000
257,221,372
1,916,109
1,300,732
165,790
47,764
260,651,767
18,649,540
279,301,307
26,
92,
127,
3j,
1,
2,
Total
UNKRA Amount
413,021 36,158,725
2,217,252
142,857 31,445,169
6,456, 428
12,955,676
438,oo
1,346,759
840,002 100,923,571
902,615 542,861,952
298,495 734,803,542
616,446 23,737,690
836,850 6,652,146
052,632 8,099,492
014,933 4,954,032
134,819,356
5,200,124
140,019,480
778,246,902
101,534,883
879,781,785
Table VI
Per Cent
of Total
by all
Countries
4.1%
.25
3.57
.73
1.47
.05
.15
11.47
61.7
83-49
2.69
.75
.92
.56
88.41
11.54
99.95
While the record thus far which has been covered by this analysis
reflects the experience through 1958, it should be noted that in the per-
iod since that time there has been a steady increase in the budget estim-
ates for the regular budget of the United Nations. The budgetary expen-
ditures for the year 1959 totaled $61,460,607; The appropriations voted
for 1960 totaled $63,149,700; and the gross expenditure requirements
for 1961 were initially estimated at $67,453,750.1
The Record of Payment
The record of payment of contributions to the regular budget of
the United Nations has been generally satisfactory; the record of pay-
ment of contributions to special programs, most of which have been on
a voluntary basis, has been less so. The Secretary General's Annual
Report for 1959-60 showed that all contributions to the regular bud-
gets for the years prior to 1957 had been paid in full, but that as
of May 31, 1960, the status of the 1960 contributions and those in
arrears for 1959, 1958, and 1957 was as follows:
Assessment for the year, in U.S. dollars
1960 1959 1958 1957
Total amount 58,37,514 61,500,000 51,500,000 49,o88,050
Payments and 13,819,164 57,685,096 49,999,363 49,023,491
other credits
Balance due 44,28,350 3,814,904 1,500,637 64,559
1Annual Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization,
June 16, 1959-June 15., 1960; General Assembly Official Records: 15th
Session, Supplement I (AA390)
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Under provisions of resolutions of the General Asbembly,
arrangements were made whereby member states were given the max-
imum facilities to pay their contributions in non-U.S. currencies.
Fifteen member states in 1959 and 12 in 1960 availed themselves of
the opportunity to do so.
In order to finance budgetary expenditures pending receipt
of the contributions and to meet advances for unforeseen or extra-
ordinary expenses, the Working Capital Fund of the United Nations,
has been under increasing pressure. At the lhth Session of the
General Assembly in 1959, it was decided to raise the level of the
fund, to continue in 1960 the authorization to the Secretary General
to borrow under specified conditions from special funds and accounts
in his custody for purposes which would normally relate to it, and
to extend that authorization to cover short-term loans from govern-
ments. The maintenance of an adequate level of cash balances avail-
able to meet current disbursements pending receipt of contributions
continues to be a matter of continuing concern. In the fall of 1960,
with expenses in the Congo mounting, the financial position of the
U.N. was for a time precarious and remains critical.
The record of payment of contributions for special programs,
particularly the United Nations Emergency Force and the United
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees ii the Near
East, has not been satisfactory. According to the Secretary Generalts
Report, unpaid assessments for 1957, 1958, and 1959 for the United
Nations Emergency Force amount to over $19,000,000.
During 1959 the United Nations Relief and Works Agency ex-
pended or committed 36.5 million dollars against income of only
34 million dollars, drawing the balance from working capital. The
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level of pledges and contributions received for 1959 was below the
minimum amount required by the Agency. The Agency's budget for 1960,
excluding commitments from 1959, amounted to 38.7 million dollars
against which it had, at the end of May 1960, received only 6.5 million
dollars in contributions from governments. According to the Secretary
General's Report, the financial position of the Agency could not be
considered as satisfactory.
The contributions to the United Nations Expanded Program of
Technical Assistance for economic development in 1959 fell substan-
tially short of the level achieved in the preceding year. Contribu-
tions pledged by 83 governments totaled $29,658,008, which represented
a decrease of $1,649,185 from 1958. Although 16 governments had in-
creased their pledges, this increase was more than offset by the re-
duction in the dollar equivalent of other contributions and by the
lowering of the matching percentage from 45 to ho per cent for the
pledges of the principal contributors. As of December 31, 1959,
actual payment represented only 89.1 per cent of the total pledges
for the year.
In the case of the United Nations Special Fund - the other
major technical assistance enterprise - contributions pledged to it
for 1959 by 68 governments totaled $25,814,817, but as of May 31, 1960,
payments amounting to only $23,642,365 had been received.
The inadequacy of contributions and the delay in collecting
voluntary contributions for special programs, especially those which
are vital to the preservation of peace and stability, have been the
cause of a growing concern which has frequently been expressed by
the Secretary General in reports to the General Assembly in recent
years. The efforts to apply the principle of assessment on a propor-
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tionate basis for such purposes as the UNEF and the Congo operation
have been frustrated in practice by the refusal of those members who
opposed such actions to contribute to such efforts.
Conclusion
In summary, while the arrangements and experience to date in
financing the United Nations regular budget and special programs has
not involved inordinate amounts of money when compared with other ex-
penditures of the member states, the load thus far has been carried
by a very few members, with the United States the major contributor.
An impasse has not yet been reached, but the increasing requirements
and conflicting interests and policies of the member states suggest
that, unless new approaches to them are found, the financial problems
of the United Nations may endanger its whole future.
The actions of the United States have direct relevance here,
The steady drive in both the legislative and executive branches of
the United States Government to reduce the proportion of the United
States contribution to the assessed budget of the United Nations re-
sulted in a General Assembly decision in 1957 that no country should
contribute more than 30 per cent of the assessed budget, culminating
a process begun when the United States was assessed 39.89 per cent in
1946. In the meantime, even while the United States under Congressional
pressure worked to lower its contribution quota, the United Nations has
grown in scope and activity until the present peak was reached. The
conclusion is inescapable that the lower proportion is probably not
realistic in today's operations.*
OThe reduction to 30 per cent was to be put into effect gradually from
1958 to 1961 as new members joined the United Nations. The rate approved
by the General Assembly for the United States assessment in 1958 was
32.5 per cent. See U.S. Participation in the U.N.,, Report by President
to the Congress for the Year 1957, pp. 238-239.
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The drive to reduce the United States proportion has been accompanied
by Congressional demands in some instances to place a dollar ceiling
on the amount of the U.S. contribution, along with a tendency in re-
cent years to reduce the proportion of matching which the United States
would be willing to undertake for some voluntary programs.
One must conclude that, although these pressures may not have
seriously handicapped the United Nations operations thus far, and
granting that in the financing of the Congo operations the U.S. ac-
tually increased its proportionate share of UN. costs, it is likely
that taken as a whole, they have had the effect of limiting the growth
potential of the United Nations. The positions taken by the United
States in recent years on financial matters lead to the qgestion of
whether American policy at least has not been more concerned with
defense and control of existing patterns of financing the United
Nations system than with seeking new approaches to the problem of
increasing revenues and finding more equitable and practical immed-
iate and long-range methods of meeting the financial requirements.
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II PROPOSALS FOR FINANCING THE UNITED NATIONS
Within the United Nations the efforts to deal with the finan-
cial problem have been concerned primarily with the rates of assess-
ment for the regular budget necessary to offset the reduction in the
U.S. rate of contribution; improvements of the cash position by ad-
justments in the Working Capital Fund and by efforts to secure payment
of contributions due; whether special programs shall be financed by
assessment or by voluntary contributions; efforts to redtice operating
costs; and efforts to secure greater coordination of budgetary and fiscal
procedures.
The efforts to finance special programs such as the UNEF by
assessment have met with strong opposition in some quarters for reasons
indicated earlier in this paper and have not been successful thus far
in securing prompt payment of contributions.
Efforts to improve the financing of programs which fall outside
the regular United Nations budget and which are financed by voluntary
contributions have been concentrated in the Negotiating Committee for
Extra-Budgetary Funds, appointed by the General Assembly in 1958, The
programs covered by the Negotiating Committee include the Expanded Pro-
gram of Technical Assistance, the United Nations Special Fund, UNICEF,
UNRWA and the program of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees. A special pledging conference for contributions to the two
refugee programs was initiated in 1958 and has been continued since,
as has the Negotiating Committee. While these efforts appear to have
achieved some degree of success in securing additional pledges, they
have not been as successful in securing prompt payment of the pledges.
All of the efforts within the United Nations to date have
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appeared to deal only with current problems; they have not reflected
any widely considered attempt at improving the financial position of
the United Nations beyond the year at hand.
Discussion within the United States Government appears to have
taken the line that not much more is possible than has been tried, but
that there is no objection to having the United Nations find new sources
of revenue as long as they do not infringe on the sovereign rights of
the member governments or result in the loss to the members of any
present direct or indirect control over the expenditure of the funds.
The major creative proposals on financing which have been put
forward in recent years have come from private sources; and, while
they may offer promise for the future, most of them do not appear to
grapple with immediate or short-range problems in a manner that has
much chance for acceptance. Even the future period for which they
would be suited on the assumption that the United Nations will move
rapidly in the direction of a supra-national government, is at best
very distant.
Some Specific Proposals
Among the major proposals which have been advanced in recent
years and which still appear to be relevant to the financial problem
as it has evolved are the following:
(1) The Report of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace2
This report recommended the establishment of an adminis-
trative and "programmatic" budget to which sources of direct
revenue for the United Nations would be applied. It suggested
that possible sources of direct revenue for exploration include:
(a) P'ivate contributions of individuals, organizations,
philanthropic foundations, etc.
(b) Usufruct of the ocean beds and acquisition of Antarctica
(c) A percentage of the amount spent by member governments
for defense expenditures
2Report of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, Arthur N.
Holcombe, Chairman. Strengthening the United Nations, Harper and
Brothers, 1957.
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(d) Taxes and excises
(e) Development of public services by the United Nations
and its Specialized Agencies which might be sources
of direct revenues, e.g., consultant services to govern-
ments or private organizations by the United Nations
in special matters of economic, political, or social
development; fees for international radio licensing
through the ITU; fees for international health
certificates through the WHO; and fractions of the
returns of interest on loans from the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development or ay other
international development agency.
Of these suggestions those which offer any prospect of acceptance and
adoption in the near future are private contributions and tees for
international services, including specifically a fraction of the inter-
est collected by international loan agencies. Although private contri-
butions would be limited as to both amount and use, such revenues when
sought for specific purposes might be of greater value to the United
Nations than the amount would indicate.
There are precedents for gifts to public-supported institutions.
Foundations in this country and in other member countries could well be
encouraged to make contributions for specific purposes such as buildings
(the grant of the Ford Foundation to the United Nations for construction
of a library building and the original gift of land by John D. Rockefeller
for the United Nations headquarters are examples) and for experimental
projects, particularly where such experimentation could result in an
increase in the ability of the new members of the United Nations to
provide financial support for the United Nations or lessen their need
for international financial assistance.
Of the fees for international services, collecting a fraction
of the interest paid on loans by international loan agencies appears
to be the most promising both because of the ready availability of
such revenues from current operations in process and because it would
require a minimum of expense in the collection and payment procedure.
It would of course require approval of the member governments of the
agencies involved. This suggestion appears to be of such promise as
to warrant early study. It might be particularly attractive to the
member governments if the proceeds were applied to the economic de-
velopment activities of the United Nations.
The other suggestions of the Commission may have long-range
usefulness, but they run the risk of being costly to administer or
being dependent on programs and activities the cost of which may far
exceed the benefits to be derived from income. They are also not
likely to be accepted either until certain preconditions are estab-
lished or because of the apparent threat to the sovereign rights of
the member states. In any event, they do not appear to offer any
promise for alleviating the needs for the near future.
(2) A more far-reaching proposal was that made by Grenville Clark
and Lewis B. Sohn in their book, World Peace Through World Lawl when
they proposed a "collaborative revenue system" under which each mem-
ber nation would assign in advance to the United Nations all or part
or certain designated taxes assessed under its national laws. Each
nation would undertake the entire administrative function of collect-
ing such taxes, and they would be paid directly to a fiscal office of
the United Nations to be located in each member nation. According to
the authors, such a procedure would make it unnecessary to create any
3 Grenville Clark and Lewis B. Sohn, World Peace Through World Law,
Harvard University Press, 1958.
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considerable U.N. bureaucracy for this purpose.
An important feature of the proposal is an over-all limit on
the maximum amount of revenue to be raised in any year, Aamely, two
per cent of the gross world product as estimated from year to year
by a permanent committee of the General Assembly to be known as the
Standing Committee on Budget and Finance. The General Assembly would
adopt the annual budget covering all U.N. activities and would deter-
mine the amounts to be supplied by each member nation. Those amounts
would be allotted on the basis of each nationts estimated proportion
of the estimated gross world product in that year subject to a uniform
"per capita deduction* of not less than 50 per cent or more than 90 per
cent of the estimated average per capita product of the ten member
nations having the lowest per capita national product as determined by
the General Assembly. No nation, however, would be liable in any one
year for a sum exceeding 2 1/2 per cent of its estimated national
product.
The proposal also provides for borrowing power by the United
Nations with the limitation that the total U.N. debt outstanding in
any year should not exceed 5 per cent of the gross world product in
that year.
The Clark and Sohn proposal may offer a possible approach to
to financing the United Nations if and when the organization is given
much more power than it now has and if and when the member nations are
willing to relinquish some of their sovereignty, but it appears to
offer no solution to the problems of the next three to ten years* The
prospects for acceptance either by the United States or any of the
other developed countries appear at this time to be nil.
However, there are two features of the proposal which warrant
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study now and may have some application to the immediate needs and
problem. These are the provisions which give some relief to the mem-
ber nations having the lowest per capita national product and the
provision for borrowing. These will be discussed in the next section
of this paper.
(3) Another proposal which offers a partial solution to the immedi-
ate financial problems of the United Nations is that made by Lincoln P.
Bloomfield in "The United Nations and U.S. Foreign Policy".h Bloomfield
suggests that financial assistance for a United Nations security force
might be effected by the use of a portion of United States military
assistance funds by recipient countries for the training of personnel
and supporting services to be placed at the disposal of a U.N. command.
This would have the effect of providing indirect assistance by the
United States. It has the advantage of providing a feasible way of
securing financial assistance by earmarking some of the funds already
being appropriated. However, it raises a number of questions which may
interfere with its acceptance unless adequate safeguards are provided.
First, if this device is applicable to the United States, it should and
would be applicable to other member nations, and thus would require ad-
equate United Nations control on the use of the funds so earmarked and
on the use of the armed forces provided. Assurances on both of these
points, which involve political agreements of a high order, would likely
be required before the United States Congress would agree to the use of
its appropriations in this manner. On the other hand, unless other mem-
ber nations made an equivalent effort, the proposal would have the effect
of being another effort primarily borne by the United States and would
not serve the purpose of securing U.N. action or responsibility. While
4Lincoln P. Bloomfield, The United Nations and U.S. Foreign Policy,
Little, Brown and Co., 1960
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the suggestion offers a practical means of securing financial
assistance for one of the major needs of the United Nations, and
primarily offers a means by which the United States can provide
support, it does not attempt to deal with the total problem of
financing the United Nations or with securing financial support on
an extensive multilateral basis.
The critical weakness of existing proposals is that they
require for adoption conditions within the United Nations which do
not prevail at this stage of that organization's developments and
therefore do not offer any prospects for the near future. However,
as Leland Goodrichhas pointed out, "The United Nations has shown a
remarkable capacity for development with the limits of the existing
Charter. There is no reason to believe that the possibilities of
further development have been exhausted." 5 This observation
certainly applies to the questions of financing the United Nations.
It is well worth while to examine the elements of the problem with
a view to courses of action possible in the United States and in the
United Nations in their present setting.
5Leland M. Goodrich, The United Nations, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1959
III GUIDELINES FOR FUTURE POLICY
The need for a constantly expanding growth in activities and
services of the United Nations is likely to become increasingly
pressing due to the nature of the modern world itself and the expand-
ing membership of the United Nations with all of the attendant problems
of new nations. The machinery for securing and preserving peace and
for achievement of conditions of stability and development will be more
comprehensive, complex, and costly as time advances.
The prospect of other problems of the nature of those encountered
in the Congo and other needs for peace preservation forces would alone
present formidable requirements for financial support. The continuing
tasks of assisting the economic development of the newly developing
countries will increase in magnitude. The new problems for multilateral
action which will be presented by new scientific developments, the
organizational structure required for an effective system of arms control
-- these and scores of other demands on the United Nations suggest that
the dimensions of future financial requirements will make it essential
that the financing of the United Nations be given intensive and concerted
study by all members.
The programs desired by the member nations will determine the
financial needs; the extent of the desire will influence the willingness
or determination to find the necessary financial resources for such
programs. The development of a policy for future action is complicated
by the need to consider the problem not only for the United Nations
system as a whole and in its relationship to the financing of other
multilateral efforts including regional organizations, but also in
the light of the domestic and foreign political realities of the time.
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The Problem
The financial problems of the United Nations are both immediate,
requiring action in the next three to ten years, and long range. The
three major categories of financial needs may be classified as general
administration and operations; security, i.e., peace forces; and special
economic, social, and educational programs.
The problem in the immediate future is to provide adequate finan-
cial resources to meet the requirements in these categories under present
limitations of the Charter while providing for participation by all mem-
ber nations, taking into account both their ability to contribute and
their participation in the policy decisions which affect the use and
control of funds, and ensuring shared responsibility and obligations
by the member nations.
Funds for security (peace forces) must be available at an early
date on a substantially increased scale and under conditions that permit
flexibility in administration. Funds for general administration and
operations, i.e., the normal expenditures of the regular budget, will
need to be available on a gradually increasing scale, with provision
for adequate cash operating funds to meet current budgeted requirements.
Funds for the special programs must be available in substantially greater
amounts under conditions that eliminate or reduce the current uncertain-
ties resulting from lack of payment of pledges of voluntary contributions.
The problem for the long-range has the additional feature of re-
quiring new sources of revenue of much larger dimensions than will be
required in the near future. Changes in the relative economic and
political positions of the current membership of the United Nations,
as well as the propect of a score or more of future members, will play
an important part in determining the financial system which will be
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possible. It will be further influenced by the trends toward increasing
or diminishing the authority of the United Nations.
With these elements in mind, we turn to a consideration of
possible lines of action on the part of the United States and of the
United Nations.
Possible Courses of Action--Short-term
(1) A proposal by the United States for the establishment of a special
Security(peace preservation) Fund to be available to the Secretary General
to finance promptly the cost of the establishment or maintenance of forces
such as the UNEF, United Nations forces in the Congo, and peace observation
missions which are authorized by the Security Council or General Assembly
and within the terms of budgets approved by the General Assembly. Funds
should be made available by member nations on an interest-free loan basis
to be repaid, and the fund perpetuated by assessments to members over a
period of years with the schedule of payments related to the capacity of
member nations to pay. A precedent for the interest-free loan arrange-
ments was established by the 65 million dollar United States loan to the
United Nations for building the United Nations headquarters. The provi-
sion for repayment on a graduated schedule related to capacity to repay
should permit deferred payment over a period of years for the new and
underdeveloped member nations, which, even if not contributors at the
present time, would be obligated to make contributions when able and to
contribute to building up a replacement for the funds originally secured
on a loan basis. The ultimate size of the fund should be determined
after careful preparation of estimates of requirements but should be
of sufficient size to guarantee that United Nations peace preservation
actions could be initiated promptly and successfully. The
order of magnitude of such a fund
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for the next three to ten years might be as much as 500 million dollars,
of which the United States should be prepared to advance 50 per cent or
more on a loan basis. Provision should be made for an early down payment sufficient
to meet the urgent needs for the first two years.
Although the United States would have to make the major contribu-
tion in the form of an interest-free loan and a sizable though smaller
contribution toward the repayment of the loan and toward the perpetuation
of the Fund, those contributions would be made in a setting and form which
could secure a much greater sharing of obligations and responsibilities
than has been possible under the systems of contributions which have been
used to date.
Studies would be required of the possibilities of permitting
members to make a portion of their payment in goods or services. Studies
would also be required of methods of control of use of the Security Fund
to ensure that the will of the Assembly is not frustrated. Consideration
might be given to limiting the benefits of the fund to those countries
which pledged a payment to the fund, whether under a present or deferred
payment plan. The use of the fund might require the affirmative vote of
a majority of the permanent members of the Security Council.
(2) Increase of the present Working Capital Fund by contributions of
members on an assessed basis to permit greater flexibility in meeting
obligations of the regular budget pending receipt of regular contribu-
tions. The amount should be determined by an examination of the exper-
ience in securing payments of regular contributions.
(3) An immediate review of the estimated financial requirements for
the next three to ten years for the items normally covered in the regular
budget, and preparation of estimates of available income and the capacity
of members to contribute. Such studies should include an examination of
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the prospects for financing any part of the requirements from such
sources as:
Contributions from individuals, organizations, and foundations
for such purposes as capital improvements (building and equipment)
and for experimental programs that give promise of improving the
capacity of new member nations to provide financial support for
the United Nations, or that may provide the basis'for the
development of income-producing or self-liquidating activities.
Income-producing activities
Contributions of goods or services
(4) Financing of special programs not otherwise covered by the Security
Fund by a combination of grants (contributions) and interest-free loans
with repayment provisions on a similar basis to that proposed for the
Security Fund,
(5) Exploration of the possibilities of providing borrowing authority
on the part of the United Nations to finance potentially self-supporting
activities, including the possibility of direct sale of obligations (bonds)
to the public in small denominations.
(6) Initiation of studies of the possibilities of securing income from
fees, including a portion of the interest payments on loans of interna-
tional loan agencies.
(7) Re-examination of the present scale of contributions to the regular
budget of the United Nations with a view to adopting a new scale which
would permit graduated payments by new member nations with a low gross
national product, the amounts to be increased over the years as the
capacity to pay increases. This could result in a temporary increase
in the amount of contributions required of other members.
(8) Initiation of studies with a view to developing a coordinated
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and integrated program for financing such international efforts.
, Possible Courses of Action--Long-Term
Assuming that the long-term period will extend beyond the next
ten-year period, studies should be initiated now that will provide a
basis for developing future policies and proposing organizational and
legislative (Charter) changes. Such studies should include the
following:
(1) The preparation of estimates of the nature and dimensions of
the long-range financial requirements of the United Nations.
(2) The preparation of estimates of the probable capacity of member
nations to pay, based upon estimates of such factors as economic growth.
(3) An examination of potential new sources of revenue, e.g., income-
producing activities and the lease or sale of resources, sources of energy,
supplies, or territory that may be brought under international control,
(4) An examination of methods of contribution and assessment under
conditions likely to exist in the long-range period.
(5) An examination of the methods for control of use of funds in
terms of the political and economic relationships of member nations
under the anticipated changes during this period.
(6) An examination of the alternatives to multilateral financing
(limitations and potentialities), e.g., bi-lateral financial arrange-
ments, financial aid administered under a Colombo Plan type of assistance,
and bi-lateral financial arrangements under the supervision of the United
Nations.
(7) An extension of the studies suggested under 8 above concerning the
long-range financing of all multilateral organizations.
In the absence of such studies as suggested here, and without both
concerted effort by all member nations and strong and positive leadership
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by the United States, it is impossible to foresee any ultimate solution
to the problem of financing the United Nations.
The importance and urgency of the growing financial problem of
the United Nations and its complex nature require leadership as strong
as any that the United States has provided in other fields of interest
in the United Nations. That leadership might well be another aspect
of the President's "Call to Action* in his Inaugural Address. If it
is considered of major importance as part of a grand strategy for the
mobilization of the efforts for peace of the United Nations, even if
only of its Free World Members, the United States would have an oppor-
tunity to demonstrate again its dedication to peace and to the concept
of shared responsibility for the achievement of that goal,
The United States will have to continue to be a substantial
financial supporter of the United Nations in the years immediately
ahead. However, other members, especially the nations of Western Europe,
the British Commonwealth, the Soviet Union, and Japan, are in a position
to provide a larger share of support than they were in earlier years,
Recognizing the ever-present possibility that the Soviet Union may not
wish to join the efforts, the United States will need to continue to
provide a niajor source of support, but the suggestions offered here
are intended to provide a method by which others may share in the
obligations and responsibilities of financing the United Nations.
If the United States Government should see fit to give the
caliber of leadership and support required to this effort, it might
go far toward breaking the attitude of frustration which has accom-
panied United Nations efforts thus far to preserve the peace. The
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approach to the problem will have to be made both within the United
States and the United Nations. The studies required for the develop-
ment of the United States position should involve both the Executive
and Congress, experts in the field, and the leadership of the various
segments of American life whose support is vital to the success of any
plan which may be developed. In short, the United States may need to
mount an effort comparable that which was required for the drafting
and adoption of the Charter of the United Nations.
Similar efforts will be required on the part of other member
countries and by the Secretariat of the United Nations. The General
Assembly has the benefit of two committees whose expert knowledge could
be drawn upon, namely, the Committee on Contributions and the Advisory
Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Matters. However, to insure
the stimulation of new ideas, it may be well to supplement these com-
mittees by the creation of an ad hoc or special committee of the
Assembly to work on the problem with the use of panels of experts
to advise on various technical aspects of the problem.
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